Civil 2

CIVIL CASE # 94-05108 Continued.

CV 94-28 To Index

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA MARICOPA COUNTY

MARGARET LOEB, et al.,          /   Plaintiffs,

Vs                                                   /   No. CV 94-05108

LEONARD ZANTEN, et al., )    /

Defendants.                                   /   ARBITRATION

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Glendale, Arizona November 3, 1994

BARRY & HETZER Court Reporting by: CECELIA BROOKMAN, RPR

Prepared for: MR.  LEONARD VAN ZANTEN 11 - 3 - 94

Witness, OFFICER KEN BLANCHARD

Direct Examination by Mr. Vance

ARTHUR W. VANCE

LEONARD VAN ZANTEN

INDEX TO EXHIBITS

Documents from State Farm

ARBITRATION Was taken on November 3, 1994, commencing at 10:00 a.m., at the offices of the arbitrator, Thomas A. McCarthy, Jr., 5540 West Glendale, Suite B-103, Glendale, Arizona, before CECELIA BROOKMAN, a Notary Public in and for the County of Maricopa, State of Arizona.

The plaintiffs were represented by their attorneys, Law Offices of Edmund D. Kahn, by Mr. Arthur W. Vance.

The defendants were represented by Leonard Van Zanten, in propia persona.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Let's go on the record.  Will the three of you raise your right hand and be sworn.

(Mr. Vance, Van Zanten, and Blanchard were duly sworn.)

ARBITRATOR Mc.Carthy: Any opening comments?

MR.  VANCE: This is an automobile accident.  We will be relying on the police officer's testimony vis-a-vis the statement that the defendant, through the police officer, how the accident happened.  I'll propose to call the defendant as my witness for cross-examination under the rule.

Very simply, it seems that -

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: We're staying with an opening statement?

MR.  VANCE: Yes that it's an intersection situation and the defendant is planning to make a left turn.  My client was coming from the right, and according to his testimony, as I understand it will be, my client had a right turn signal blinking, and he, quote, assumed, unquote, that she would turn right, and she did not.  So he made his left turn and she struck him, or he struck her.  In any case, there was a collision.

That's the liability.  And of course, we're seeking damages which are liquidated, which consists of only two items: The amounts of money, and I have the checks from State Farm to Mrs. Loeb, to the body shop and so forth, approximately seventy-one, whatever is in the complaint, seventy-one.  And she had a thousand-dollar deductible policy.  So the total liquidated damages are in the sum of $8108.61.

We would also be seeking pre-judgment interest from the date of the payment, which is recited in the complaint; and our costs, which we will supply to the court after we receive your decision, allowable court costs.  That's our case, Your Honor.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Sir, do you have any opening comments?

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: The accident occurred because Mrs. Loeb' she came from the Cadillac dealer on Camelback Street and made a left turn and was driving completely next to the curb, with her right turn signal on.  She was going very slow, fully like somebody is going to make a right turn, completely, and so on that I'm based, I'm sitting here with my wife in the truck waiting already five minutes there, and I said to my wife, "Well, this one is making a right turn."  I'm waiting for another car, so I pulled up, bingo, she hit me.  And my statement is that she intentionally turned.  She was intending to make a right turn there, because I drove that street several times again since here.  It's quite a distance.  The average speed, which I found out yesterday, is 40 to 60 miles an hour.  She was going approximately 20; 25 miles an hour like as if you were making a right turn.

I was kind of angry when the accident happened, I said, "What happened?  You're going to make a right turn, all of a sudden you're not going to make a right turn."  She said, "No, I didn't have my signal on."  Then her son said, "Yes, mother you did.  Remember I told you to turn it off?"

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Let's stay with rather kind of a synopsis, rather than the testimony.  We will have that opportunity in a few minutes.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: My contention is she turned the signal on, and I had a right to rely upon that, fully convinced she was going to make her right turn, and she should have considered the fact, hey, if I'm going to forego my right turn, I should watch out that somebody might pull up in front of me.  She didn't.  She never stopped to brake, never made any kind of move to forego the accident.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Yes, sir.

MR.  VANCE: I will call first Officer Blanchard so we can have him do his duty and get out of here.

OFFICER KEN BLANCHARD, Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q. (BY MR.  VANCE) Officer, were you involved in the investigation of this accident?

A. Yes, sir.

] Q. Did you, as part of your investigation -- well, let me say, when you got to the scene of the accident, what did you find?

A. I found both vehicles still at the scene, sir, and I was able to locate and identify both drivers.

Q. Did you speak to them both?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. Were you able to ascertain a point of impact?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe to the court what -- how you did that?

A. First, I located the two vehicles that were involved, I made a mental note of the damage, the location that the vehicles were damaged.  I was able to find a scuff mark on 12th Street, in the intersection of Colter, which clearly gave me my area of impact.

Q. What was the damage to the respective cars in terms of what part of the car was damaged?

A. The vehicle that's listed as number one, Mr. Van Zanten, Mr. V's vehicle, was listed as Vehicle No. 1.  The damage was to the left side of the vehicle.  Vehicle No. 2, which was traveling northbound on 12th Street, had damage to the front portion of the vehicle.

 Q. Were there signals controlling the intersection?

A. 12th Street and Colter is a residential area, open intersection except for stop sign east and west on Colter.

Q. Which of the vehicles would have been controlled by the stop sign?

A. This gentleman's vehicle here was controlled by a stop sign that stopped the westbound traffic from entering onto 12th Street.

Q. Was there any sign that would have controlled Mrs. Loeb's?

A. No.

Q. Will you tell us what you were told by the respective parties.

A. The gentleman driver, listed as Vehicle No. 1, indicated to me that he had been stopped at Colter at 12th Street facing westbound for quite a period of time.  His intention was to make a left turn to go south on 12th Street.  He noticed a vehicle traveling northbound on 12th Street, in the curb lane.  The vehicle displayed a right turn signal, or was displaying a right turn signal.  He assumed that the vehicle was going to be making a right turn onto Colter from 12th Street because of the slow speed.  As the vehicle approached, traffic allowed him from -- traffic that was traveling southbound, there was a break, so he entered the intersection with the intent to make a left turn, and the collision occurred.

MR.  VANCE: Thank you, Officer.  I have no further questions.  You may cross-examine.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: He stated the truth.

MR.  VANCE: If Your Honor please, my next witness will be myself, and I will testify.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: I need to ask, do you need to ask the officer to remain?

MR.  VANCE: No.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: He may be excused?

MR.  VAN ZANTEN; Yes.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: You're excused, then.  Thank you.

(Officer Blanchard left the hearing room.)

ARTHUR W. VANCE, called as a witness, having been previously duly sworn, stated as follows: STATEMENT

MR.  VANCE: As the representative of State Farm, I would testify that the following bundle of papers, including the checks paid to Mrs. Loeb, indicating her deductible portion, the Xerox pictures of the automobile, and the outline of all the damage to her vehicle, which had been provided to the defendant be offered in evidence.  Would you like to see them again?

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: No, I have the same copies.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Is there any objection to these being introduced into evidence?

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: Haven't they all been introduced into evidence?  Don't you have the entire file from the court?

MR.  VANCE: He's thinking about the disclosure statements.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: I understand they are in the file.  They are not in evidence as such so they are not to be considered as evidence unless they are presented at this time, and Mr. Vance has now presented them as evidence.  And my question is, do you object to them being introduced as evidence?

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: No.  What I don't understand, then, is they were mailed to the court, I mailed my part to the court, and according to the letter stated here, that the arbitrator would pick up the entire file four days previous to the hearing.  I'm more or less assuming that you have all these papers.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Regardless of what's in there, that could be there and much, much more can be in that file.  However, the question is, Mr. Van Zanten, not what's in the file but what's in evidence, as if I were sitting here as a jury.  The mere fact that something is sitting in a court file doesn't make it appropriate for it to be considered by me in rendering a decision.  It is appropriate, if it's introduced in evidence at this time, without regard to what might or might not be in that court file, or without regard to what instruments you guys may have exchanged as part of the discovery process.  Mr. Vance has offered these as evidence and the question is, at this point, do you object to any part of this?

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: No.  My only question was, like they're being presented twice in evidence now?

MR.  VANCE: In those, I would testify, they are kept in the regular course of business and submitted to our office as part of this claim.  And upon that, I would rest.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Mr. Van Zanten, this would be your opportunity to defend or -- by way of testimony.

LEONARD VAN ZANTEN called as a witness, having been previously duly sworn, stated as follows: STATEMENT

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: My defense is that I have not denied my guilt in this part.  I would have looked one more time, and maybe prevented the accident, if possible.  On the other hand, I was very careful.  In fact, I came from the street and I purposely ignored a light and went there, so to stay away from the business traffic so I wouldn't get any trouble, I get into trouble.  

The point of the matter is here, if I'm being sworn before God that I keep his law, then the judge should also keep by the same law. And it is God's law that if you make a promise, that you give somebody your word, you keep it.  If you don't keep it, you're either a liar or a thief or both.  

In that respect, the plaintiff is equally guilty to me and we should both be liable for the damages.  That's my contention.  It's not like a mere accident where you forgot because if she had a left signal on, I would not have crossed the street.  

There's no question about that.  Her right signal was on.  If she had gone the full speed, which I went yesterday several times checking to see how fast traffic goes, if she had gone 40 miles an hour, I wouldn't have gone because she forgot to turn it off.  She was going half that speed, very close to the curb.  There was no question to me whatsoever as to what her intentions were.

And from the testimony that was at the scene, the son said, "Yes, mother you did have your signal on.  Remember, you were going to turn it off?"  I think she turned, because I don't know what the person is thinking, but this is assumption, of course, is she was planning to do so, and decided against it.  

And her son said you better turn off your signal, then, because somebody, you know, with the implication, hey somebody might interpret it like you're going right and this fellow might be in trouble, then.  She should have realized that: If I'm going to forego my right turn, I better watch out somebody isn't going to misinterpret my signal.  

So in that respect, she is just as guilty in the matter as I am.  And if she had assumed that none of this would be happening, I have not contested anything.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Anything further, sir?

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: That's basically what it comes down to.

MR.  VANCE: I have no questions on cross-examination.  I would submit this matter to the court.  I'm willing to make a brief statement.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: If you believe it will be helpful.  I would like you to comment on the apparent negligence issue that has been raised.

MR.  VANCE: The question that appears to me, for the court, I think Mr. Van Zanten has raised, interestingly, different language than we would use, is a question that the court has to decide what duties fell upon my client.  Insofar as I know, in the strict interpretation of the traffic code, there are: 

Thou shalt not turn without making a signal.  Now, other parts of the code would say that she has the right-of-way to go through that intersection, whether or not she has a signal, and there doesn't seem to be any code that I know that speaks directly to that.

The question would then involve the court's thoughts as to a common law duty to not to forebear from making a right turn signal.  I don't think the speed -- she's chargeable with going too slow.  I don't think that's a problem.  I think it's entirely the comparative, if you find comparative, is a question of her having the right turn signal on.  I would admit that the lower speed might tend to induce him to make a mistake.  But our emphasis is that he made the mistake.

The statute is quite clear that he must forebear going through the stop sign in making his left turn until she has cleared the intersection, and therefore, he is quite right in admitting that he was wrong.  If the court can find a legal basis for comparative negligence, then I believe that that should be apportioned and I think that I will leave it up to the court what apportionment is fair, depending, 

I would assume, in this case, upon the relative wrongdoing of the two parties, since I will admit, they both, if she wasn't around, they both contributed in some sense to the accident.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: I would like to ask a question, too, in a moment, but I'd like Mr. Van Zanten to have an opportunity to respond to those comments first.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: Well, if what Mr. Vance is saying is true, on the other hand, it's like he's saying if you make a turn and do not use a signal, it's definitely against the law.  But it is said, so it's not illegal, not against the law, if you're driving with the signal on.  All that's yes and no, the common law is if it interferes, if it causes harm to somebody like in this case.  

Because a lot of times, when you drive behind a person that had the signal on, you just forgot to turn it off.  It's the same thing.  I'm looking at her with the right signal on.  If she'd gone full speed, I would have considered she forgot the signal.  She was going half speed.  That, combined with her signal, gave me the confidence that she really was intending to make a right turn.

So you have to consider the speed, because normally, driving on the road, you know, somebody going 60 miles an hour with a right turn, you know they're not going to make that turn, you figure they're not going to make a right turn; they can't make a right turn.  If you go by what Officer Blanchard says, you never trust any signal.  If you go through a green light and somebody hits you, you could fine him, too.

So you can find all sorts of implications that way She was negligent, contribute negligent in this respect, that she should have considered her signal, which she knew was on for somebody behind her.  She should have considered the person in front of her, while she had her eyes clearly to the front at all times.  I'm sitting here, turning my head back and forth, making sure this side was clear, boom, the accident occurred.  

Or if I had been in her position with my eyes forward, the instant I started moving, she should have seen that.  She could have swerved to miss me.  I don't know why she didn't, because she hit only the very front part of my vehicle, the bumper.  Ten inches, it would have cleared it.  So in that respect, I'm saying she has contributory negligence in that respect.

MR.  VANCE: The only comment I would have, I think it's interesting that he raises the specter of someone behind her, with someone behind her seeing a right turn signal has the option, under the law, to assume that she was going to make a right turn.  I think the answer is clearly, no.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: Somebody behind her.

MR.  VANCE: If you were behind her and you saw a right turn signal, I think the law is fairly clear that you have no right to assume and then act on the assumption that she's going to turn right.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: If you're behind her, you'd have to wait.  If she slows down, you slow down.  If she doesn't, you're assuming she had her signal on in error.

MR.  VANCE: I just point out that that's a different perspective.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: I'm 57 years old, I've been driving for many years, on the average of three hours a day on the road, so it's not like I'm ignorant of the rules of the road or what people do and don't do.

MR.  VANCE: I didn't mean to suggest that.  You had some questions, Your Honor?

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: I'm going to reverse the directions and assume that there was a requirement for the defendant to yield on an unsignalized intersection.

MR.  VANCE: No stop signs either way?

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Yes, but we have the obligation to yield to traffic approaching from his left.  I understand we've reversed those directions.  And we have the turn indicator on and the slow speed.  Is there a comparative negligence question?

MR.  VANCE: If we change the facts to that, I think it makes a much more iffy case, and there's so many things come into play when you have no controls.  As a matter of fact, my grandfather was a great western judge starting in the early 1900's, so he lived through the period of time that automobiles first came on the road in Kansas.  

And he used to tell me that the rule in some states those days was that when they reached the uncontrolled intersection, both parties had to stop their cars, get out of the cars, go to the center of the intersection, have a discussion and decide who was going to go first.  Later on we adopted the idea whoever was coming closest to the intersection the other one should forebear.  Then we adopted, assuming mechanical, assuming that's not easy to judge, the guy on the right and the guy on the left, and so forth.

I think that would be unfair to apply that to the modern system, where we have put a control in, and where the defendant was very conscious of his duty.  And therefore, even if the court were to find some contrite in this case, I would think that the measurement, the percentage should be heavy on the defendant, more heavy than on the plaintiff.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Would there be a distinction, in your mind, if it were an uncontrolled intersection and the defendant had the obligation to yield, as opposed to a circumstance where there is a stop sign and the defendant has the obligation to wait until another vehicle has specifically cleared the intersection?

MR.  VANCE: No, I wouldn’t see very much difference between that.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: In my defense, I wrote a few examples of what I found in the records.  An example here, it says bicyclist struck automobile in the street intersection was not contributory negligent as a matter of law, and failed to yield right-of-way to the automobile which entered intersection from his right in view of the evidence that motorist was not used to acquire ordinary care.  Even though he failed to yield the right-of-way, he was negligent.

There is another one here: The driver of a motorcycle obeying the traffic laws and observed the automobiles approaching some distance away and did not know if driver watched to obey the traffic law, wasn't considered to be negligent merely because she did not witness the approaching automobile but presumed the driver would obey the law.

For example, where applicant enters the second intersection while Beckert is approaching, Appleton has the right to assume Beckert will obey the law.

What I'm saying, I had the right to assume she was going to make the right turn not only because of the signal, but her speed.  Because if her speed had been full speed, I wouldn't have started.

MR.  VANCE: I think I would agree that if you had a jury here, you would instruct them that both parties had the right that the other party -- to believe that the other party will obey the law.  There's a jury instruction in that.

The question that I have posed to the court is: A, whether or not there was some law, written or unwritten, that required my client not to have a right turn signal on, and allows you to assume, under those circumstances, that she's going to turn right, either from the speed or from the signal.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: What about the law of giving false indication?

MR.  VANCE: Philosophically, I agree with you.  The question is whether there's a statute.

MR.  VAN ZANTEN: I'm basing mine by law.  We were just sworn before God, so the judge is telling me: You obey God's law or else.  Should not the arbitrator obey the same law, then?  Doesn't God say you give somebody a word, you make a yay, yes, no, no; you don't speak no lies; when you promise something, you keep I

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: Okay.  Anything further gentleman?

MR.  VANCE: No, I have nothing.

ARBITRATOR McCarthy: All right, then, we're concluded.  I'll take this under advisement.

(The hearing concluded at 10:26 a.m.)

STATE OF ARIZONA COUNTY OF MARICOPA.

I, CECELIA BROOKMAN, a notary public in and for the County of Maricopa, State of Arizona, do hereby certify that the foregoing printed pages constitute a full, true and accurate transcript of the proceedings had in the foregoing matter, all done to the best of my skill and ability. 

 WITNESS my hand and seal this day of November 1994.

CECELIA BROOKMAN.  Notary Public My Commission Expires: October 4, 1996  

CV 94-29

LAW OFFICES OF EDMUND D. KAHN.  Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA

MARGARET LOEB, et al.,                                  NO. CV94-05108

Plaintiffs, ARBITRATION AWARD

LEONARD V. ZANTEN,

Defendants. _____________________________________

The above matter coming on regularly for Trial on November 3, 1994 and Plaintiffs appearing by their counsel, Arthur W. Vance, and Defendant not appearing, the Arbitrator, Thomas A. McCarthy being fully informed in the premises now makes his Arbitration Award as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs have Judgment against Defendants LEONARD V. ZANTEN for the sum of $8,108.61 with interest at 10\from December 21, 1993 until date of this Judgment in the sum of $769.35, plus costs in the sum of $178.75, the whole aggregating the sum of $9,056.71.  Plus interest at the legal rate of 10% per annum from the date of Judgment until paid. 

 DATED: Dec 7 - 1994

Signed, Thomas A. McCarthy, Arbitrator  

CV 94-30

Arbitrator

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA

MARGARET LOEB, et al,        / NO: CV 94-05108

Plaintiff,                                     /     NOTICE OF DECISION

v.                                                 /    OF ARBITRATOR

LEONARD V. ZANTEN,        /    Assigned to the

Defendant.                                 /     Honorable Stanley Z. Goodfarb

As Arbitrator for this cause, I find in favor of Plaintiff Margaret Loeb and against Defendant Leonard V. Zanten in the amount of $8,108.61, with interest thereon at the legal rate, from' December 21, 1993, until paid.  Prevailing party shall submit to me a proposed form of award, an affidavit in support of attorney's fees, if attorney's fees are recoverable, and a verified statement of costs, and serve same upon opposing party within 10 days from the date of this notice, all in accordance with Rule 5(a), Uniform Rules of Procedure for Arbitration.

Dated Nov 30 1994.  Signed.  Thomas A. McCarthy.  Arbitrator

Glendale, Arizona

CV 94-31

Leonard Van Zanten.  Riverside Calif.

DEFENDANT (APPELLANT)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA.

Margaret Loeb, et all.                         / NO CV94-05108

Plaintiff’s      (APPELLEE)                  / NOTICE OF APPEAL

VS.                                                        /

Leonard Van Zanten. )                       /

DEFENDANT    (APPELLANT)       /________________________

APPEAL.  

 Comes now the defendant (appellant) before this honorable court according to rule 7 of the uniform rules of procedure for arbitration - invoking his right of appeal.

BASIS FOR THE APPEAL

 Violation of common and statutory laws protecting the rights of the defendant, and of the rules and regulations for Arbitration and of the court.

 Pursuant to the foregoing, defendant (Appellant) respectfully request that this action be referred to the Court Administrator for appointment and record of appeal. 

Dated.  January 11-1995 '

Leonard Van Zanten.  Defendant (Appellant)

Copy of the foregoing mailed (Certified) on January 10-1995

CV 94-32

Leonard Van Zanten, DEFENDANT (APPELLANT)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA,

Margaret Loeb, et all.                      /    NO. CV94-05108

Plaintiff’s    (APPELLEE)                 /   APPEAL FROM ARBITRATION

VS.                                                     /   AND

Leonard Van Zanten.                       /   MOTION TO SET FOR TRIAL

DEFENDANT    (APPELLANT)    /__________________________

APPEAL

Comes now the defendant (appellant) before this Honorable Court according to rule 7 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure to Appeal from Arbitration.

BASIS FOR THE APPEAL.

Violation of common and statutory laws protecting the rights of the defendant, and of the rules and regulations for Arbitration and of the court.

MOTION TO SET FOR TRIAL

 Pursuant to the foregoing, defendant (Appellant) respectfully request that this action be referred to the Court Administrator for appointment to trial. 

Dated.  January 19 - 1995.  Leonard Van Zanten.  Defendant (Appellant)

Pursuant to rule Vla) of the Uniform Rules of Procedure, following is list of witnesses and exhibits intended to be used at the trial.

1. COMPLAINT from Arbitration dated Jan-19-1994

2. SUPPORTING EVIDENCE Exhibits A, thru.  H. 

Exhibit A. Arbitration award by plaintiff.

Exhibit B. Transcript of Arbitration proceedings.

Exhibit C. Award signed by Arbitrator.

Exhibit D. Certification Compulsory Arbitration.

Exhibit E. Verified statement of cost.

Exhibit F. Arbitrator Letter to the Court

Exhibit G. Notice of Decision of Arbitrator.

Exhibit H. Letter Oct 8-94 Plaintiff & Arbitrator.

CV 94-33

Leonard Van Zanten.  DEFENDANT (APPELLANT)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA.

Margaret Loeb, et all.                          /       NO. CV94-05108

 Plaintiff’s    (APPELLEE)                    /      C O M P L A I N T

 Vs.                                                         /

 Leonard Van Zanten.                          /

 DEFENDANT   (APPELLANT)         /

 

 Comes now the defendant (appellant) before this Honorable Court to hear, try, and adjudge the following violations of law, common and statutory, and of the rules of the court and of the ethics belonging thereto. 

Violation of law.  PERJURY BEFORE THE COURT.  (PLAINTIFF)

Making deliberate false statements whereby to gain undo and unjust favor by the court.  - False entry in Arbitration award.  Plaintiff's ET all.  knowingly made false statement before the court, to enter quote; "And defendant not appearing," unquote. Ref: (Exhibit A)

Plaintiff was at all times aware of the presence of defendant by his counsel Arthur W. Vance, at the trial on Nov 3 1994 at the premises (office) of Thomas A. McCarthy Jr. serving as Arbitrator.  Hence, Defendant was witnessed by Cecelia Brookman, Court reporter, Barry & Hetzer, written transcript of said proceedings - noted Exhibit B.;

Violation of law.  PERJURY BEFORE THE COURT.  (ARBITRATOR)

The above evidence, Exhibit B together with Exhibit C, also shows Thomas A. McCarthy (Arbitrator) guilty of perjury before the court (False entry in the award, to wit: "And defendant not appearing".  Which clearly demonstrates negligence and irresponsible on the part of the Arbitrator, and; shame upon the court - since said Arbitrator was appointed by, and before the court.  For while the instigation of this lie rests with the law office of Edmund D. Kahn - Thomas A. McCarthy, as duly court appointed Arbitrator did affix his signature and approval to the same.  (Exhibit C)

If a man signs a contract to purchase an automobile without first reading the same, he may be considered unwise, wherein nonetheless the law does not alleviate him from responsibility.  Yet more than unwise it shall be for a judge, or for an Arbitrator not to read the short form by which he instigates a judgment against a person that may very well deprive him of his needs to feed his family.  Which therefore is ethically, and morally, as also lawfully inexcusable, and demonstrates the person irresponsible in his official function.

Violation of law FRAUD BEFORE THE COURT.

Violation of rule 1(e)(6) of the Uniform Rules of Procedure for Arbitration that "No party seeks an award in excess of the jurisdictional limit for arbitration set by this court, including punitive damages but excluding interest, attorney's fees, or costs."

Defendant charges each of the plaintiff's and their attorney's, and Arbitrator, with fraud before the court, in as much as they collectively, and knowingly, in violation of URPA rule 1(e)(6), contrived to defraud defendant with such sums as are called "interest and costs," which by said rule, and by their own consent, were exclusively EXCLUDED.  Evidence of the same is set forth page 1 of Exhibit D lines 21 thru 22, of the rules of arbitration.  And Exhibit C, E, F, and G. ' 

Violation of THE FIRST AMENDMENT.  DISCRIMINATION.

Discriminatory action for reasons of race, creed (faith), sex, and wealth, or the lack thereof.

The instant when on Nov 3 1994 defendant (I) entered the office of Thomas McCarthy (Arbitrator) I immediately sensed and knew that the sentence was already decided against me by the Arbitrator.  From the moment I entered his office the arbitrator would not look me in the eye, nor say hello or any' other word or motion such as persons normally have when they meet each other.  It was as though I had the plague, or were the plague.  During all of the time defendant was there the arbitrator said no more except as he absolutely had to in order to conduct, what to me appeared a vain trial.  When therefore the arbitrator evaded me as someone of no account, he on the other hand talked up a storm with my opponent, which after the hearing (while I concluded with the court reporter) continued on outside the office, for no better reason - that I was able to determine - than to be outside of my hearing.

Why therefore was I looked upon and treated in such manner by this Arbitrator if not I strongly allege was an act of discrimination, in not only my sin of not being financially able to hire counsel, and thus having to conduct my own defense, but more so for my choice and my strength of faith (belief) in which I had spoken in some documents (Exhibit H).  

And as I questioned the Arbitrator, he had not read the courts file, nor therefore the extend of my defense.  If then that in itself may not be a sin, it is when the case is already decided before the trial takes effect by an act that can only be classified as discrimination.

The Arbitration simply did not like what I had to say, and how I said it, while my conduct and reasoning bears only upon the virtues of full truth and of flawless justice, which in its particulars is my faith and my strong defense, a law and duty that from the Almighty God, our Creator rests upon all of us, but which not everyone for lack of knowledge believes 11 in, nor to their disadvantage adheres to.

Violation of law CONTEMPT OF THE COURT AND OF ETHICS

Undo and malicious contempt on the part of the representative of the court (Arbitrator) swearing his subject under the law while knowingly (Exhibit B) setting himself above the law.

How is it possible when a one person swears another person under a law, such as the law of God that one shall not pronounce false witness, nor steal, yet himself ignores it altogether and judges that other person in direct violation of that law?

Shall it not be a law and absolute fact that the instant when a judge or arbitrator commits his subject under a certain' law that he himself shall also be liable to the same law!

Wherefore the instant the Arbitrator took the oath from the litigants he was lawfully and duty bound to find plaintiff contributory negligent, guilty of false witness, and attempted theft.

Illustrating the above; The judge (arbitrator) under oath and as then being the representative of not only the court but also of and before God, adjures litigants that they shall neither pronounce false witness, nor steal, nor violate any other rule of the one same law, or be liable for perjury and contempt, both before God and the court, which in all effects is an institution of and before Him.  Yet then the Arbitrator himself in contempt of the oath violates every statute thereof by rendering a judgment in direct contradiction of each of these statutes.

The law by the oath given, renders not only a violation of a word given of necessity as false witness and theft, but even so much a word freely given to bestow a gift, Quote; ("If one promises a gift and then does not perform it, shall it not be a theft?"  Unquote [God]).  Which comes to show how the integrity of our word should be, and how flawless the perception should be that we have of the law and of justice, and how explicitly the same is to be executed.

The defendant did not lie to nor at any time attempted to rob the plaintiff.  On the contrary, while the defendant was duly given the right of way to cross the street, and damage occurred to his vehicle - defendant forgave plaintiff said damage on the premise that defendant in part might be guilty, giving plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.

Plaintiff on the other hand intentionally with fore-knowledge gave a false indication for the defendant to rely upon, which then in the reckless care (see VII, "Legal basis for Plaintiff's contributory negligence") of the plaintiff became a violation of common law, and of statutory law in the oath before God, and in the precepts of the court.

Hence; The representative of the court (Arbitrator) in his violation of the oath - to set himself above God and above the law, and greater than the court - conclusively bears the greater guilt compounded in the fact that said Arbitrator was well aware of these facts, the same having been quoted and discussed before him at the trial of Nov 3-1994 (Exhibit B).

 VIOLATION OF LAW, 14th AMENDMENT, US CONSTITUTION.

FAILING TO PROVIDE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

Defendant's right under the 14th amendment was violated when the representative of the court (Arbitrator) pronounced lies before the court regarding the presence of the defendant at a hearing?

Hence it is of no protection of the laws when contrary to the rules of civil procedure for arbitration both plaintiff and arbitrator collectively unite to rob defendant of sums in excess of what is allowed.  (Interest and costs).

Defendants right as equal protection under the laws was violated when from plaintiff's own testimony she failed to use due care and diligence under the law plaintiff was nonetheless given to rob the defendant.  (Court file and all the testimony therein.)

Defendant's right for equal protection under the laws was violated when Arbitrator took an oath from the litigants, and proceeded to set himself above and contrary to the same oath and the statutes thereof.

LEGAL BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

Evidence from plaintiff's own testimony (Court file) shows how after having turned on to 12th street she intentionally moved to the right of the road, turned on her right signal, and slowed in her speed intending to make a right turn at Colter Ave.  And that then in conversation with her passenger (at a last instant) she decided to change from her intend, and instead pass straight on, at which plaintiff's passenger admonished or warned her, to turn off her signal . . ..  The passenger may thus be commended to have spoken for safety sake, a natural reaction to prevent that which ultimately did occur, namely, the collision.

Negligence of the Plaintiff's then began when she altered her intend and course of action upon the road, for while in all the previous instances; a: Plaintiff had defendant in view at all times directly before her, and b: Plaintiff was aware of defendant's intend and course of action which he wished to pursue, and c: Plaintiff had given the defendant to understand that she was to turn before him, and not pass upon the road before him, plaintiff therefore should have paid more than reasonable care in her - late - change of action towards the  defendant considering the natural resultant implications the same may have upon the defendant as well as upon plaintiff herself.

Plaintiff however did not as - according to the precepts of the law, Quote; "Use care and diligence as required under particular circumstances.  Unquote.  Wherefore - according to the precepts of the law, Quote; "Any person which fails to use that degree of care which is required of him, or her under any particular circumstances is liable in negligence to the person who directly sustained damage or injury as a result of his or her failure."  Unquote

Plaintiff therefore is negligent in not using the required care when at such a late instant she changed from her promise and intend towards the defendant, of which she knew the defendant could not be aware, since he, as everyone, must rely upon a given word, be it verbally or by means of a signal.

It is therefore in this negligence of the plaintiff that she came to damage the defendant.  Which is compounded in the fact that at no instant did plaintiff make any attempt to stop, or to swerve around the defendant so as to prevent the imminent collision - which in due care and diligence plaintiff should have foreseen the instant when she changed her mind and course of action upon the road.

Defendant, by common law and the judgment of other judges before him, (Defendant answer to complaint - court file) had the right to rely upon plaintiff's lawful intend that she would follow through upon her word and as such obey the laws of the road.  (Which is not to be construed as if therefore it shall at all times be wise to rely upon others to follow through on their intend, or to obey the laws).  As defendant therefore for his error in wisdom assumed partial responsibility, the same is not a crux for the plaintiff in her negligence to be absolved from responsibility.

Defendant submits before the court, that; The statutory law by which it is stated that; "A person shall not enter upon a street, or cross upon a road from an intersection, unless it is save to do so," has no definitive bearing upon this case, and that in many cases the same becomes no more than a poor excuse.  It can always be said; "You are guilty since a collision did occur."  Which then of course makes the collision itself the cause leading to the collision - which in all respects is of course impossible.

Example:  If one is looking out to intentionally ram another while the latter crosses the street, the latter is then held the blame, since according to the ill assumption, or wording of the law - he was the one crossing the street.

As therefore ill precepts may bring justice into injustice it is the Court's duly to see to it that neither defendant nor plaintiff are cited merely because a collision occurred, but to look to the true and aggregate cause leading thereto.

Copy of the foregoing mailed (Certified) on January 20-1995 to: 

Edmund D. Kahn: Thomas A Mc. Carthy Jr.  Honorable I, Sylvan Brown For Stanley Z, Goodfarb  & Arbitration Department 

Signed this day Jan 19-1994 Leonard Van Zanten.