Civil 1

CIVIL CASE 94-05108

             TO INDEX    

             CV 94-4

To: City of Phoenix Municipal Court.


Be it known to you - and all men - I hereby exercise my right to appeal against the judgment you have entered against me.  Because for as much as I even quoted you the law, and rendered right judgment in your hearing, you chose to ignore the law, and scorned right judgment, wherefore now I am placing a charge against you the judges.

Since however there are not known to me any judges of right judgment among men, my appeal is before the One Great and Almighty Judge, that He may judge between me and you, nor is my charge against one, but against all judges and their associates everywhere.

This my charge is: All you men when you enter and pass through the schooling for law - the term "JUSTICE" is totally eradicated from your hearts and from your minds.  And the law - as it was given - mutilated to such an extend that righteousness has all but vanished.  And so it is my charge that - you do not enter these schools to abide by the law, nor to judge by it, but learning how to circumvent the same, and to abort its precepts.

And coming to the bench you took delight in exercising your own imagination, rendering judgment according to your own sense of law and justice.  Accordingly, before all the people you have made justice to a mockery, and it is so in all of the land.

This guilt now will not be forgiven you, since you took delight it in, and were pleased to act without mercy.  If only you would not have angered me endlessly with your disgusting portrayal of injustice, wherefore now I am pronouncing this judgment upon you; that in the day when the rod to rule nations is given into my hand, it shall be my pleasure that not one of your kind shall ever judge again, or hold any position of consequence into forever and ever.


This appeal will be made public, you do not have to file this in your records - since I have appealed to the Greatest Judge, and the same is recorded with Him.  Date of trial is set to commence shortly, all the accused (judges) will be notified as to the hour of their trial and escorted before the tribunal.


CV 94-17


Margaret Loeb Et al       /        NO. CV94-05108

Plaintiffs                          /        DEFENDANTS COUNTER-CLAIM.

Vs                                     /

Leonard Van Zanten     /

Defendant  ________    /________________________________

TO: Plaintiffs


Defendant hereby requests "plaintiff" to admit to the truth of the following matters:

1.  (Reference paragraph 1) Law, Quote: "A person may not be prosecuted twice for the same offense whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor.  And, the plea of "former jeopardy" may only be entertained by the court if the current prosecution is for the same identical offense as the prior one."  Unquote.

Exhibit (2) herewith placed into evidence of which plaintiff was aware prior to referred to allegation.

1(a) Trial for the offense is to determine cause and liability for damages sustained to plaintiff.  Whether or not therefore defendant was insured cannot determine cause, nor prohibit defendant from providing remuneration in the event verdict for this action is in favor of the plaintiff.  Hence, Plaintiff, by admission, offers judgment in moneys, and seeks no other relief other than a money judgment.

2.    That; Negligence in the plaintiff was the PRIMARY cause wherein the accident came to occur.

3.    Plaintiff failed to provide right of way after duly having awarded said right of way to the defendant as a result of which plaintiff inflicted property damage to herself as well as to the defendant.

4.    Plaintiff by lawful promise in the combination of her "signal" her "speed" and her "position" upon the road, having given (relinquished) to the defendant the "right of way" directly in front of him, FAILED to keep her promise.

5.    That said promise was not accidental nor a slip of the mind.  But that plaintiff intentionally turned on her signal, while reducing speed and moving to the right of the road, intending to make a turn to the right.

 6.   Defendant entertains as to the further cause of the accident that; either plaintiff changed her mind from her intended course at the last instant, or; was so involved in conversation with her passenger as to pay no attention to her driving and forgot her intended turn.

7.    Plaintiff did not use required ordinary care and diligence in the operation of her vehicle in such way to move for and to signal for a right turn after which plaintiff diverted from said movement and intention at an instant in time too late for the defendant to recognize and consequently re-direct.


8.      Defendant's counter-action is not for moneys as it is for equal opportunity under the statute of justice.

9.      Since it is plaintiff's intend to covet a conviction against the defendant upon a previous citation and verdict by trial that was "only" against the defendant - wherein plaintiff’s were neither cited nor tried, defendant hereby invokes the right to redress said citation and verdict in the following manner:

(a) To without a writ of "Coram Nobis" on the afore-said verdict show, prove, charge, plaintiff with contributory negligence.

(b) Defendant's right by statute of law: "A person accused of a crime violating a specific law has the right to challenge the law if it is so vague and indefinite that it does not set up definite and ascertainable standards of guilt."  And: "Can show that he was deprived of a fair trial by a violation of due process, or, the equal protection of the laws".

10.     Defendant entertains to prove that to presume (rely upon) that motorist will obey the law and/or rule the road - is not a violation of law.

11.     Defendant entertains to prove to plaintiff that, just because an officer of the law cited a person - that the same shall not therefore be lawful or right.

(a) Or: Just because an officer of the law makes a statement that "One is never to trust a signal", that the same shall therefore be right or lawful.

(b) Or; That on the basis of the above sentiment a lawful citation may be issued, nor that this therefore shall make the same lawful nor just.

c) Or; Just because an officer of the court (judge) rendered a guilty verdict on the basis of the above sentiment rather than to law - does not therefore make said verdict necessarily just nor lawful.  Unto which defendant made his appeal before the High Court, for while the law in its clarity was recited before the officer of the court he choose to ignore said law and judge by a sentiment, which as defendant is obliged to show, has no abiding as lawful statute.

Dated June 22 1994.  Leonard Van Zanten.  

CV 94-18



Plaintiff                                          /          No CV 94-05108.

MARGARET LOEB et al.             /

Vs                                                    /           DEFENDANTS  STATEMENTS

Defendant                                       /          OF DEFENSE.

LEONARD VAN ZANTEN          /______________________________

COMES NOW defendant by "Exposition of law" to show the quality thereof, and the tenure of one's (our) word.  And by "Application" illustrate the equality and/or inequality as they apply, and the essential factor in the honesty and gravity of one's given word.


1.       That: The practice of signaling is statutory law, an obligation enforceable by law.  Wherefore; as it is a violation of law in failing to give a signal, so; a signal given in error is a violation of the same in that either are equally prone to result in grave consequence to life and/or property.

2.       As therefore a failure to provide a signal is punishable by law - so a signal given and not adhered to - must equally be punishable by law, since in the definition of law he or she, in the second as in the first instance, is giving a false indication.

3.       Furthermore; since the law of signaling, in its intend, is to safeguard the wellbeing of the flow of traffic in an orderly and well defined manner, the "well defined" is conversant as also homogeneous to a solemn mutual word and understanding of the participants to abide by the same, which (rather than using a bull-horn to communicate with everyone) is laid forth by means of signaling.

4.       Accordingly, it is a breach of his or her word that in all instances is and must be taken as solemn as any oath, which cannot, and may not be taken, nor applied unilaterally.

5.       Illustration: If one gives his word to repay a debt, but then he does not repay it, it is a breach of his word, and action against him is enforceable in court.  As grave therefore as a mere word is to merely a material loss - so much the more grave is the word (by signal) that by common knowledge is known to threaten life in bodily harm, and must therefore be held enforceable.

6.      There is no law but as of God and no law is higher than His law, wherefore also in the courts the participants are sworn before God.  For as much therefore as the courts enforce it upon its participants to be sworn before God, they (the courts) cannot very well pronounce an action contrary to His sentence of law, lest the courts be in violation of their own demands.

7.      As then this defendant recited the law in one of its most eminent declarations, to wit:    "If one makes a promise to give a present, but then he does not give it shall it not then be a theft?"

8.        It clearly invokes that; whereas a reneging on a word for nothing greater than a gift is already a theft, how much more shall not he or she be acclaimed a thief which reneges on a word given that results into harm - as it is in the case of the plaintiff to the defendant?

9.       The high law then is no different from the law of man, for where He said; "Let your yea be yea, and your nay be nay," He calls us to be forthright and stand upon our word which in the courts is upheld in its many various ways.  And where He said, "Owe no-one anything but to love them," is reflected in all of our laws that serve to the well-being of everyone.

These desires, as we may call virtue's, from their High descend, are very much interwoven with us as common law, as further evidenced by the media (Newsweek Magazine June 13-94), speaking of the declining values in our society, the question was posed as to "What is virtue?"  In which four affirmatives were listed to wit, Fortitude, Temperance, Prudence, and Justice.

For "Prudence" (and bowing to the courts), it was defined as practical wisdom, and the ability to make the right choices in specific situations.

"Fortitude" then exemplifies the defendant in the verdict and the inequality thereof pronounced against him previously, as, "The strength of mind and courage to persevere in the face of adversity".

"Temperance" then (as an essential factor to all who are to judge), was defined; "Self discipline, the control of all unruly human passions and appetites."

 While "Justice", in its definition, fortifies the defendants foregoing statements for equality and the tenure of one's word, by listing, "Fairness, honesty, lawfulness and the ability to keep one's promises".


10.   Illustration: Hendrick fails to demonstrate a signal in making a turn - and is fined.  Susan moving near to the curb fails to turn off her signal and collides with Hendrick pulling up out of a driveway, Susan is not fined but Hendrick is.

11.   The inequality of the law is shown here, in that while in the first instance there was no harm done in Hendricks turn, yet he was cited and fined, - while Susan in her negligence (along with Hendrick in the second instance) did cause harm and yet was justified.

12.   As then negligence under the law is defined as, "The failure to use care and diligence as required under particular circumstances."  So the blame should be put on both, for while it can be said of Hendrick that he did not use care and diligence relying himself upon the signal of Susan.  Susan is no less guilty of the same, which is not only in her signal as such but her speed and position upon the road as well, on the sentiment that she did not use care and diligence regarding her signal.

13.   And whereas it can be said of Hendrick that he broke no law (on the sentiment that Susan had promised him the right of way), Susan on the other hand was in violation of the law in that she was giving a false indication.

14.   If therefore - by presumption - a false indication is not a violation of law then by: Illustration: Claudia is driving behind Derek who displays a right and is slowing down, as then Claudia attempts to pass Derek on his left - Derek turns to the left to enter into his own driveway and collides with Claudia.

15.   Rightfully, by law, the blame for the accident is wholly on Derek.  But here comes officer Blanchard and cites Claudia for failing to give Derek the right of way - and justifies Derek on the sentiment that; in effect, "signals are worthless and never to be relied upon."  If then officer Blanchard has a valid point in that we should not always trust signals so easily - that sentiment does not therefore invalidate the fact that signals are statutory for a definite purpose, and as such are law and enforceable by law.  For by the same token it can be said that signatures on contracts are worthless since not everyone at all times adheres to them.  Just because then some people may not adhere to the law does not therefore invalidate the law.

16.   For now in addition to the foregoing comes this implication resulting from the - half truth half fallacy - of the officer Blanchard that in justifying Derek he in essence abolishes the entire law regarding signals - for which reason he of course can no longer cite anyone for failing to give a signal, nor even for having defective signals.  And by the same token he strangles the Judge from imposing fines for the failure or misuse of any signal inclusive such option as stopping for a green light - since, out of the mouth of the law (officer Blanchard with the accord of Judge Freeman) signals are not to be relied upon.

17.   If an the other hand officer Blanchard had cited both Claudia and Derek - he would not with his words "to distrust signals" have, in its whole, invalidated the law regarding signals, his word as merely a word to the wise.  Yet shall not this therefore be the end of the matter, for what Justification shall we ascribe to officer Blanchard for citing Claudia in addition to Derek?  The answer must be culled in reviewing the circumstances.

18.   Illustration: If Derek's position was on the left of the roadway, then Claudia should have surmised that here was something in error and- accordingly was to await what Derek was really going to do.  If on the other hand Derek's position was to the right of the roadway - Claudia would have no suspicion but that Derek was ready to turn as he indicated.

19.   In the first instance Claudia would be in error (violation of law) in not using due care, which is in the application of the law that circumspect negligence as well is in the utilization of common sense.  While in the second instance, Claudia should not be cited since Derek with his signal as well as with his movement and position gave no indication that he was about to stab Claudia.

20.   If now Susan claims she was not aware that her signal was on, and Derek; that by accident he had turned the wrong signal on (claiming ignorance), then yes, if there were no harm done there is a degree of compassion.  But that does not take away from the confirmed fact that just as ignorance of the law is no excuse, so ignorance of one's action is no excuse, and, as many cases will indicate, are accountable before the court.  For while compassion, to forgive is a spiritual virtue, the law in itself cannot but demand its right.


21.   Now let us behold what it entails to say "right of way" in the illustration of Hendrick verses Susan, and with Derek and Claudia, as also with Loeb and Van Zanten (plaintiff and defendant).

Public roads are for everyone; the right of way upon any part of that pavement is for everyone.  Hendrick has the right to turn unto the pavement even as Susan has the right to pass upon that same part of the pavement, only not simultaneously.

It is therefore so ordered that one must await or precede the other, to which end rules as well as signals were established.  As then one (in the first part) upon indication has the right to pass upon any part of the pavement by any change of direction provided there is no impairment preceding him, so (in the second part); upon an indication to forego the right of way upon any part of the pavement, that right is then vested in the party of the first part.


22.   (On basis that failure to provide right of was not always vests unilateral guilty.  Bicyclist struck by automobile at street intersection was not contributory negligent as matter of law in failing to yield right of way to automobile which entered intersection from his right in view of evidence that motorist did not use required ordinary care and skill in control and operation of automobile.  (Green Vs Pedigo 1946 170 P2d 999 75 Ca 2d 300.)

23.   (On basis that presumption of lawful obedience is not a violation of law.)  Driver of motorcycle who was obeying traffic laws and who observed automobile approaching some distance away, and did not know if driver was to obey traffic laws - was not contributory negligent merely because he did not witness the approaching automobile but presumed its driver would obey the law.  (Lee Vs Stephen 1935 47p2a 1105 8 Ca 2d 650)

24.   Where Appleton enters intersection while Beckhard is approaching: Appleton has right to assume that Beckhard will obey the law.  (Appleton Vs Beckhard 1953 254 P2d 948-117 Ca2 70.)

25.   (On abuse of foregoing right).  One entering by the foregoing right - to assume that the other will obey statutory provisions, that such right can be abused and careless exercise of such right can be negligence.  (Ripple Vs Coat 1952 245 P2d 593-111 Ca 2d 903.)

Defendant certifies that he did not act in abuse of such right, nor in such carelessness to fall under such sentiment of negligence.

DETERMINING FACTORS (plaintiff Vs defendant).

26.   Defendant submits that he can be found to have contributed to the accident since though ever previously everyone kept their intend to turn, this reliance (in his judgment) is not absolute in that not everyone at all times are known to keep by their word.  And, although the defendant in this particular case took extra measures of care and diligence, he nonetheless could have looked left just once more and possibly have avoided the accident.

27.   None of the above however takes away from the guilt, and/or unlawful action of the plaintiff to un-mistakenly indicate to the defendant her intend, and as such her promise to turn before encountering the path of the defendant (right turn).  This guilt of the plaintiff then is not only based upon negligence by ignorance, as it may be purported, but more so that plaintiff was duly aware of her signal as also of her relative speed and position upon the road.  And, that for as much as man's eyes are in front of his head - the defendant of necessity had to turn his head left and right, while the plaintiff had the defendant in her view at all times, yet made no apparent effort to fore-come the accident.

28.   The foregoing, in its parts, is based upon plaintiff's own admission (transcript exhibit 3) that she entered the road (12th Street) from a left.  And upon facts by common knowledge, that; for as much as her vehicle was in excellent condition - this signal would have turned off automatically as she recovered from the turn.  And so it is conclusive, as also the consensus of the defendant, that plaintiff intentionally turned on her right signal truly intending to make said turn.

29.   Plaintiff furthermore upon her own admission confesses to have given defendant the full indication (signal to the right) that it was not her intention to pass in front of the defendant (Transcript exhibit 3).

30.   Plaintiff et al., (Passenger) made the following remark at the scene of the accident, when defendant (somewhat angry) said to the plaintiff; "You were going to turn right!  Why didn’t you?"  To which plaintiff replied: "No I did not".  To which plaintiff's passenger, before witnesses, replied: "Yes mother you had your signal on, remember, you were going to turn it off".

Defendant hereby introduces transcript of hearing: Leonard Van Zanten, 1-13-94, Division 4, Judge, and Freeman, into evidence, as exhibit 3.

WHEREFORE, defendant prays for judgment against plaintiffs as follows:

1.     That plaintiff take nothing by way of their complaint.

2.    For cost of suit herein.

3.      For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

Dated June 22 1994.  Leonard Van Zanten Defendant


CV 94-19



Plaintiff                                             / NO: CV94-05108

MAGARET LOEB, et all                 /

Defendant                                         /       DISCLOSURE

LEONARD VAN ZANTEN            /__________________________________

TO:      The plaintiff, the court, and all people inquiring after me and into this matter.

 When before judge Freeman, having pleaded "not guilty," I nonetheless assumed part of the guilt upon myself, it was for this reason; that if but for the smallest of guilt is on me and I should come to deny or evade it, it then will not be men but the Lord my God who will punish me right here and now.  For He will not tolerate that deceit be found in me since I am called by His name.  Nor will He cast me from Him since being once anointed of Him it is impossible to fall away.  For again, He is a God who will not hold the guilty guiltless, wherefore should any guile be found in me He will forthwith visit me. 

But then again of course, aside of this excellent fear of the Lord it was my good pleasure to before all else judge myself, and render to myself the guilt as also the innocence that is due.  Even as David said, "A just man chastens himself in his own judgment."

As then judge Freeman, having heard the case, asked if I had anything to say, I thought to recite the law to him by which the case may be judged fairly, which I did in one of its most eminent expressions so as to leave no doubt nor question.  Moreover, I pronounced the just verdict before him.  But as sound is to one who cannot hear, so he paid no attention to ~ such wisdom, not even in the least, and came to ferment a false judgment robbing me of my right under the law.

This then made me sad, knowing how in a short while he will surely come to regret this foolish act, and also somewhat angry, which was more so for the previous judgments of him to others which I was forced to witness.  The judge did evil in that he justified one of whom he knew she had given false witness.  He praised the liar, and glorified the thief, justifying her whose deeds were contrary to law. 

By what authority then did I pronounce such judgment?  And for what reason did I call for an appeal - while all such things are already slated for their ultimate trial before the High tribunal?  Among other things it was for the benefit of those imprisoned therein, and showing that the judgments of the courts are for scrutiny by the Highest Judge.  As then in my reflection upon the courts no confidence was shown that my appeal might show fruitful before them, I placed my trust before God.

As then the plaintiff took it upon herself to attempt to commit armed robbery against me I turned the affair over to my insurance company, who in turn came with excuses in the fine print of the contract.  I then responded by consulting an attorney to look into that policy, and meanwhile arrange and/or bargain with the plaintiff for payment of her damages (to allow her robbery).  The attorney however in his reply came to deny all charges to the plaintiff to which I signed my name since in fact this was the truth.

When therefore I received the second notification I took the matter into my own hand to show the sentence of the law and how she is to be applied.  This I did not with an aim to be justified by the court, since such confidence has yet to form itself within me, but as matter of truth and of honor to testify to the same.

If then the plaintiff will find it in herself to apologize for the immoral act which she committed in placing this action against me (which is as armed robbery, utilizing the court and/or the law as a weapon by which to commit robbery), I will find it in me to forgive her.  But if not - she will bear her guilt.  And if the court finds for the law, so much the better for the court, and if not - they will soon find the roles reversed, and my judgment on the judges will not be a small matter.  For no man is above the law, nor is there any excuse for anyone sitting in judgment to be ignorant in the least of what pertains to true law and justice.

The wise then will understand how for the sins of the court my blood will flow.  And that for the sins of the people done in ignorance my bones will not be broken.  And that judgment is in the hands of the elect from Him who judges all things. 

June 22-94.  Leonard Van Zanten.  Defendant

CV 94-21


TO: Edmund D Kahn.  Tucson AZ.  July 9-94

RE: Loeb Vs Van Zanten.

Dear Mr. Kahn.

In reply to your "question-remark", this is more than sensible English, it is REALITY.

You of all people ought to know how the whole purpose of the court is to enact justice, and that the human courts are at all times subject to the Most High Court.  Judge Freeman therefore in effect, in his verdict to me, signed his own death warrant, while you at present are not fairing any the better Mr. Kahn to take this matter of life and death so lightly.  You may not believe what I have said, but your unbelief will not stay that High tribunal, nor for your resentment will its judgment pass you by.

And I should warn you that all this inclusive everything you say and do will before long become widely known.  How then you will serve yourself to all men is up to you.  Both wisdom and folly is before you, if therefore life means more to you, and justice is not strange to you, do not allow yourself to be made an accessory to armed robbery.  Was it not the High Judge of all who said; "It were better for them to hang a millstone around their neck and be drowned in the sea than to offend even one of these little ones that serve Me.''

And regarding your letter of June 30, I think it rather childish of you to request from me that which you have already received, namely, my responds to your Service of Interrogatories, and the documents, a total of 7.  And since you are requesting a Disclosure Statement, the same is herewith enclosed. 

Cordially.  Leonard Van Zanten

CV 94-22


July 22 1994                                    Hon. I Sylvan Brown (sa-6)

NO: CV 94-05108                           For Hon. Stanley Z Goodfarb

Margaret Loeb


Leonard Van Zanten.                               Edmund D Kahn._____________________

        This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs certification Re: Compulsory Arbitration and Defendants reply thereto.  It appears clear to the court that under the uniform rules of procedure for arbitration this matter should be sent to arbitration.

        Defendant seems to base his objection to arbitration on the fact that there is no appeal from the award of the arbitrator.  Rule 7 of the uniform rules of procedure for Arbitration clearly provides the right of appeal.

It is ordered that this matter be sent to an Arbitrator for arbitration.

Received July 26 -94.  Clerk of court.


CV 94-25

LAW OFFICES OF.  Edmund d. Kahn.  Tucson, Arizona

Arthur W. Vance, Attorney for Plaintiffs



MARGARET LOEB, et al.,           /   NO. CV 94-05108

Plaintiff,                                          /  JOINT PREHEARING STATEMENT

Vs                                                     /   Assigned to Judge Goodfarb

LEONARD ZANTEN, et al.,         /  

Defendants.                                      /________________________________

TO: THOMAS A. McCarthy JR., Esq. Arbitrator

COME NOW the parties before this Honorable Court and, pursuant to URPA present the following Joint Prehearing Statement: 

 1. Uncontested Facts Deemed Material: 

On November 16, 1993 on Colter and 12th Street, Phoenix, Maricopa County, Arizona, Plaintiffs Margaret, and Samuel Loeb's automobile collided with another automobile being driven by Defendant Leonard Zanten, while uninsured.

As a direct and proximate result of this collision, Plaintiffs Margaret and Samuel Loeb suffered property damage in the sum of $8,108.61. 

2. Contested Issues of Fact and Law that Counsel can agree are Material or Applicable:

Was Defendant Leonard Zanten negligent and, if so, was such negligence a proximate cause of property damage to Plaintiffs?

Are Plaintiffs entitled to an award of damages against Defendant and, if so, in what amount?

Are Plaintiffs entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest on their liquidated damages?

Are Plaintiffs entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees based upon Defendant's failure to admit Request for Admissions served on him on May 18, 1994? 

3. Other Issues of Fact or Law Which Defendant believes to be Material:

4. The Following is a List of Witnesses Intended to be Used by Each Party During Arbitration Hearing: No Witness shall be used at the Hearing other than those listed, except for good cause shown.

 PLAINTIFFS:   The Parties

 Officer Blanchard #3764, Phoenix Police Department These witnesses will testify along the lines of the attached Arizona Traffic Accident Report and property damage estimates and will verify that Plaintiffs suffered property damage in the sum of $8,108.61. 

 5. The Following is a List of Exhibits, Which Each Party Intends to Use at the Arbitration Hearing: No Exhibits shall be used other than those listed herein, except for good cause shown.

Arizona Traffic Accident Report

State Farm's Drafts Showing Payment of Property Damage

Property Damage Estimates

Photographs of Property Damage

Plaintiffs' automobile was repaired in accordance with the enclosed estimates and such repairs were made in full at a cost of $8,108.61. 

(All of these items have been produced previously on May 18, 1994 in Plaintiffs' Disclosure Statement).

CV 94-26

TO:   Edmund D. Kahn.  Tucson, Arizona.  Attorney for Plaintiff  

REF: Margaret Loeb Vs Van Zanten.  

Dear Mr. Kahn. 

It is written; "Their libations of blood I will not pour out."  How then am I to sign my name to your joint Prehearing statement, for all falsehood and deceit is as blood guilt. 

On three separate papers you have already made your introductory clear, and I also have given my defense in clear statements, why then a repetition?  It may very well be that the court may take our repetition as an insult to their intelligence.

You came to me wishing to play a game for money, a money for which you knew you had no right, and that we place all our cards open on the table.  Well now Mr. Kahn, in olden days one was likely to get shot on the spot for such inconsistency of the game.  I however humored you, while you further insisted that nothing may be added. 

Why then Mr. Kahn are you now cheating on your own game, reneging on your own requests - in adding a charge - as if I failed to admit to your request for admissions?  I indeed failed; I failed to admit - since I denied your charges.  And now you wish to mock the course of justice and me - merely because I spoke the truth - pleading not so? 

I informed you previously that I was an officer of the Most high Court, and as such it is not only our duty but our pleasure as well to act with truth and justice to everyone at all times.  What is therefore foremost to my mind is that Mr. Loeb suffer no injustice at my or anyone's gain or expense, nor that in the course thereof anyone else should suffer injustice.  For again, shall he not be a fool that ferments injustice to himself?  This is how I was taught by the Most High Judge in the precepts of His justice, not ever to look at anything one-sided, nor to consider only the one side for which one happens to be the counsel. 

You have not served your client well in giving her ill advice.  What therefore in the day to come I am to bring upon her I will also bring upon you.  Judge for yourself: What sort of a judge shall I be, or how shall I ever be a judge in such an eminent Court if I should pronounce the plaintiff innocent, when in fact she lied to the defendant as a result of which both parties sustained damages.

 I now forgave her the lie - taking financial responsibility for the damages to my vehicle, but how shall I forgive her the theft, or the intended theft, which she is now perpetrating? 

On behalf of this defendant inform your client that it is not yet too late, but that with a letter of apology from her and from you as her counsel, I am ready to forgive.  And should neither of you be so inclined - no choice will be left me but to reward accordingly.  And that even if the court should find for the defendant - that the same will not alleviate the plaintiff nor you from guilt. 

As a counselor you should very well know how the courts in the very law by which they bind the defendant - have no choice but to find your client equally guilty.  This is inalienable and as without question, the law is very clear on that matter, if you promise something, you keep it, and if not, you shall be a thief and liar as well.

If now you care to redo your proposed Joint Prehearing Statement, being faithful to both sides and the facts, without false entries, I will add my name to it.  You have my statements and my list of exhibits, what therefore is to prevent you from doing it amicable for both? 

Leonard van Zanten.  Defendant.

Copy of foregoing mailed to: D. Kahn.  Thomas A. McCarthy Jr.


CV 94-27

Leonard Van Zanten.  Riverside Ca.




MARGARET LOEB, et al.              /    NO. CV 94-05108


VS.                                                    /    Assigned to Judge


APPELLANT (DEFENDANT)       /______________________________________



Come now the parties before this honorable court, and pursuant to URPA 4, present the following Prehearing statement.


On November 16 1993 on Colter and 12th street, Phoenix Arizona, Plaintiffs automobile collided with another vehicle driven by the Defendant, as a result of which Plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of $ 8,108,61, and defendant in the sum of  $ 2,700.81. 


That plaintiff was careless, reckless, and negligent in first awarding and promising the defendant the lawful right to cross the street (12th St.) - then abridging upon her word, plaintiff proceeded to pass straight on into the path of the defendant, colliding with the defendant. 

That in previous trial and hearings, defendants Constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment were grossly abused, and is defendant entitled to an award of damages against the plaintiff for said abuse. 

That in either case or judgment, by previous agreement neither party shall be entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest on their liquidated damages, costs, or attorney fees.