CIVIL CASE 94-05108
To: City of Phoenix Municipal Court.
NOTICE - OF RIGHT TO APPEAL.
it known to you - and all men - I hereby exercise my right to appeal against the
judgment you have entered against me. Because
for as much as I even quoted you the law, and
rendered right judgment in your hearing, you chose to ignore the law, and
scorned right judgment, wherefore now I am placing a charge against
you the judges.
however there are not known to me any judges of right judgment among men, my
appeal is before the One Great and
Almighty Judge, that He may judge between me and you, nor is my charge
against one, but against all judges and their associates everywhere.
my charge is: All you men when you enter and pass through the schooling for law
- the term "JUSTICE" is totally eradicated from your hearts and from
your minds. And the law - as it was
given - mutilated to such an extend that righteousness has all but vanished.
And so it is my charge that - you do not enter these schools to abide by
the law, nor to judge by it, but learning how to circumvent the same, and to
abort its precepts.
coming to the bench you took delight in exercising your own imagination,
rendering judgment according to your own sense of law and justice.
Accordingly, before all the people you have made justice to a mockery,
and it is so in all of the land.
This guilt now will not be forgiven you, since
you took delight it in, and were pleased to act without mercy.
only you would not have angered me endlessly with your disgusting portrayal of
injustice, wherefore now I am pronouncing this judgment upon you; that
in the day when
the rod to rule nations is given into my hand, it shall be my pleasure that not
one of your kind shall ever judge again, or hold any position of consequence
into forever and ever.
THE CLERK OF THE COURT.
appeal will be made public, you do not have to file this in your records - since
I have appealed to the Greatest Judge, and the same is recorded with Him.
Date of trial is set to commence shortly, all the accused (judges) will
be notified as to the hour of their trial and escorted before the tribunal.
Loeb Et al /
Van Zanten /
QUEST FOR ADMISSION.
hereby requests "plaintiff" to admit to the truth of the following
(Reference paragraph 1) Law, Quote: "A person may not be prosecuted
twice for the same offense whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor.
And, the plea of "former jeopardy" may only be entertained by
the court if the current prosecution is for the same identical offense as the
prior one." Unquote.
(2) herewith placed into evidence of which plaintiff was aware prior to referred
1(a) Trial for the offense is to determine
cause and liability for damages sustained to plaintiff. Whether or not therefore defendant was insured cannot
determine cause, nor prohibit defendant from providing remuneration in the event
verdict for this action is in favor of the plaintiff.
Hence, Plaintiff, by admission, offers judgment in moneys, and seeks no
other relief other than a money judgment.
That; Negligence in the plaintiff was the PRIMARY cause wherein the
accident came to occur.
Plaintiff failed to provide right of way after duly having awarded said
right of way to the defendant as a result of which plaintiff inflicted property
damage to herself as well as to the defendant.
Plaintiff by lawful promise in the combination of her "signal"
her "speed" and her "position" upon the road, having given
(relinquished) to the defendant the "right of way" directly in front
of him, FAILED to keep her promise.
That said promise was not accidental nor a slip of the mind.
But that plaintiff intentionally turned on her signal, while reducing
speed and moving to the right of the road, intending to make a turn to the
Defendant entertains as to the further cause of the accident that; either
plaintiff changed her mind from her intended course at the last instant, or; was
so involved in conversation with her passenger as to pay no attention to her
driving and forgot her intended turn.
Plaintiff did not use required ordinary care and diligence in the
operation of her vehicle in such way to move for and to signal for a right turn
after which plaintiff diverted from said movement and intention at an instant in
time too late for the defendant to recognize and consequently re-direct.
FOR THE DEFENSE.
Defendant's counter-action is not for moneys as it is for equal
opportunity under the statute of justice.
Since it is plaintiff's intend to covet a conviction against the
defendant upon a previous citation and verdict by trial that was
"only" against the defendant - wherein plaintiff’s were neither
cited nor tried, defendant hereby invokes the right to redress said citation and
verdict in the following manner:
To without a writ of "Coram Nobis" on the afore-said verdict show,
prove, charge, plaintiff with contributory negligence.
Defendant's right by statute of law: "A person accused of a crime violating
a specific law has the right to challenge the law if it is so vague and
indefinite that it does not set up definite and ascertainable standards of
guilt." And: "Can show
that he was deprived of a fair trial by a violation of due process, or, the
equal protection of the laws".
Defendant entertains to prove that to presume (rely upon) that motorist
will obey the law and/or rule the road - is not a violation of law.
Defendant entertains to prove to plaintiff that, just because an officer
of the law cited a person - that the same shall not therefore be lawful or
Or: Just because an officer of the law makes a statement that "One is never
to trust a signal", that the same shall therefore be right or lawful.
Or; That on the basis of the above sentiment a lawful citation may be issued,
nor that this therefore shall make the same lawful nor just.
Or; Just because an officer of the court (judge) rendered a guilty verdict on
the basis of the above sentiment rather than to law - does not therefore make
said verdict necessarily just nor lawful. Unto
which defendant made his appeal before the High Court, for while the law in its
clarity was recited before the officer of the court he choose to ignore said law
and judge by a sentiment, which as defendant is obliged to show, has no abiding
as lawful statute.
June 22 1994. Leonard Van Zanten.
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
No CV 94-05108.
MARGARET LOEB et al. /
/ OF DEFENSE.
LEONARD VAN ZANTEN /______________________________
NOW defendant by "Exposition of law" to show the quality thereof, and
the tenure of one's (our) word. And
by "Application" illustrate the equality and/or inequality as they
apply, and the essential factor in the honesty and gravity of one's given word.
That: The practice of signaling is statutory law, an obligation enforceable by
law. Wherefore; as it is a
violation of law in failing to give a signal, so; a signal given in error is a
violation of the same in that either are equally prone to result in grave
consequence to life and/or property.
As therefore a failure to provide a signal is punishable by law - so a signal
given and not adhered to - must equally be punishable by law, since in the
definition of law he or she, in the second as in the first instance, is giving a
Furthermore; since the law of signaling, in its intend, is to safeguard the
wellbeing of the flow of traffic in an orderly and well defined manner, the
"well defined" is conversant as also homogeneous to a solemn mutual
word and understanding of the participants to abide by the same, which (rather
than using a bull-horn to communicate with everyone) is laid forth by means of
Accordingly, it is a breach of his or her word that in all instances is and must
be taken as solemn as any oath, which cannot, and may not be taken, nor applied
Illustration: If one gives his word to repay a debt, but then he does not repay
it, it is a breach of his word, and action against him is enforceable in court.
As grave therefore as a mere word is to merely a material loss - so much
the more grave is the word (by signal) that by common knowledge is known to
threaten life in bodily harm, and must therefore be held enforceable.
6. There is no law but as
of God and no law is higher than His law, wherefore also in the courts the
participants are sworn before God. For
as much therefore as the courts enforce it upon its participants to be sworn
before God, they (the courts) cannot very well pronounce an action contrary to
His sentence of law, lest the courts be in violation of their own demands.
7. As then this defendant
recited the law in one of its most eminent declarations, to wit:
"If one makes a promise to give a
present, but then he does not give it shall it not then be a theft?"
clearly invokes that; whereas a reneging on a word for nothing greater than a
gift is already a theft, how much more shall not he or she be acclaimed a thief
which reneges on a word given that results into harm - as it is in the case of
the plaintiff to the defendant?
The high law then is no different from the law of man, for where He said;
"Let your yea be yea, and your nay be nay," He calls us to be
forthright and stand upon our word which in the courts is upheld in its many
various ways. And where He said,
"Owe no-one anything but to love them," is reflected in all of our
laws that serve to the well-being of everyone.
desires, as we may call virtue's, from their High descend, are very much
interwoven with us as common law, as further evidenced by the media (Newsweek
Magazine June 13-94), speaking of the declining values in our society, the
question was posed as to "What is virtue?" In which four affirmatives were listed to wit, Fortitude,
Temperance, Prudence, and Justice.
"Prudence" (and bowing to the courts), it was defined as practical
wisdom, and the ability to make the right choices in specific situations.
then exemplifies the defendant in the verdict and the inequality thereof
pronounced against him previously, as, "The strength of mind and courage to
persevere in the face of adversity".
then (as an essential factor to all who are to judge), was defined; "Self
discipline, the control of all unruly human passions and appetites."
"Justice", in its definition, fortifies the defendants foregoing
statements for equality and the tenure of one's word, by listing,
"Fairness, honesty, lawfulness and the ability to keep one's
Illustration: Hendrick fails to demonstrate a signal in making a turn - and is
fined. Susan moving near to the
curb fails to turn off her signal and collides with Hendrick pulling up out of a
driveway, Susan is not fined but Hendrick is.
The inequality of the law is shown here, in that while in the first instance
there was no harm done in Hendricks turn, yet he was cited and fined, - while
Susan in her negligence (along with Hendrick in the second instance) did cause
harm and yet was justified.
As then negligence under the law is defined as, "The failure to use care
and diligence as required under particular circumstances."
So the blame should be put on both, for while it can be said of Hendrick
that he did not use care and diligence relying himself upon the signal of Susan.
Susan is no less guilty of the same, which is not only in her signal as
such but her speed and position upon the road as well, on the sentiment that she
did not use care and diligence regarding her signal.
And whereas it can be said of Hendrick that he broke no law (on the sentiment
that Susan had promised him the right of way), Susan on the other hand was in
violation of the law in that she was giving a false indication.
If therefore - by presumption - a false indication is not a violation of law
then by: Illustration: Claudia is driving behind Derek who displays a right and
is slowing down, as then Claudia attempts to pass Derek on his left - Derek
turns to the left to enter into his own driveway and collides with Claudia.
Rightfully, by law, the blame for the accident is wholly on Derek.
But here comes officer Blanchard and cites Claudia for failing to give
Derek the right of way - and justifies Derek on the sentiment that; in effect,
"signals are worthless and never to be relied upon."
If then officer Blanchard has a valid point in that we should not always
trust signals so easily - that sentiment does not therefore invalidate the fact
that signals are statutory for a definite purpose, and as such are law and
enforceable by law. For by the same
token it can be said that signatures on contracts are worthless since not
everyone at all times adheres to them. Just
because then some people may not adhere to the law does not therefore invalidate
For now in addition to the foregoing comes this implication resulting from the -
half truth half fallacy - of the officer Blanchard that in justifying Derek he
in essence abolishes the entire law regarding signals - for which reason he of
course can no longer cite anyone for failing to give a signal, nor even for
having defective signals. And by
the same token he strangles the Judge from imposing fines for the failure or
misuse of any signal inclusive such option as stopping for a green light -
since, out of the mouth of the law (officer Blanchard with the accord of Judge
Freeman) signals are not to be relied upon.
If an the other hand officer Blanchard had cited both Claudia and Derek - he
would not with his words "to distrust signals" have, in its whole,
invalidated the law regarding signals, his word as merely a word to the wise.
Yet shall not this therefore be the end of the matter, for what
Justification shall we ascribe to officer Blanchard for citing Claudia in
addition to Derek? The answer must be culled in reviewing the circumstances.
Illustration: If Derek's position was on the left of the roadway, then Claudia
should have surmised that here was something in error and- accordingly was to
await what Derek was really going to do. If
on the other hand Derek's position was to the right of the roadway - Claudia
would have no suspicion but that Derek was ready to turn as he indicated.
In the first instance Claudia would be in error (violation of law) in not using
due care, which is in the application of the law that circumspect negligence as
well is in the utilization of common sense.
While in the second instance, Claudia should not be cited since Derek
with his signal as well as with his movement and position gave no indication
that he was about to stab Claudia.
If now Susan claims she was not aware that her signal was on, and Derek; that by
accident he had turned the wrong signal on (claiming ignorance), then yes, if
there were no harm done there is a degree of compassion.
But that does not take away from the confirmed fact that just as
ignorance of the law is no excuse, so ignorance of one's action is no excuse,
and, as many cases will indicate, are accountable before the court.
For while compassion, to forgive is a spiritual virtue, the law in itself
cannot but demand its right.
Now let us behold what it entails to say "right of way" in the illustration of Hendrick verses
Susan, and with Derek and Claudia, as also with Loeb and Van Zanten (plaintiff
roads are for everyone; the right of way upon any part of that pavement is for
everyone. Hendrick has the right to
turn unto the pavement even as Susan has the right to pass upon that same part
of the pavement, only not simultaneously.
is therefore so ordered that one must await or precede the other, to which end
rules as well as signals were established.
As then one (in the first part) upon indication has the right to pass
upon any part of the pavement by any change of direction provided there is no
impairment preceding him, so (in the second part); upon an indication to forego
the right of way upon any part of the pavement, that right is then vested in the
party of the first part.
JUDGMENTS EXEMPLIFIED. (Sample)
(On basis that failure to provide right of was not always vests unilateral
guilty. Bicyclist struck by
automobile at street intersection was not contributory negligent as matter of
law in failing to yield right of way to automobile which entered intersection
from his right in view of evidence that motorist did not use required ordinary
care and skill in control and operation of automobile.
(Green Vs Pedigo 1946 170 P2d 999 75 Ca 2d 300.)
(On basis that presumption of lawful obedience is not a violation of law.)
Driver of motorcycle who was obeying traffic laws and who observed
automobile approaching some distance away, and did not know if driver was to
obey traffic laws - was not contributory negligent merely because he did not
witness the approaching automobile but presumed its driver would obey the law.
(Lee Vs Stephen 1935 47p2a 1105 8 Ca 2d 650)
Where Appleton enters intersection while Beckhard is approaching: Appleton has
right to assume that Beckhard will obey the law. (Appleton Vs Beckhard 1953 254 P2d 948-117 Ca2 70.)
(On abuse of foregoing right). One
entering by the foregoing right - to assume that the other will obey statutory
provisions, that such right can be abused and careless exercise of such right
can be negligence. (Ripple Vs Coat
1952 245 P2d 593-111 Ca 2d 903.)
certifies that he did not act in abuse of such right, nor in such carelessness
to fall under such sentiment of negligence.
(plaintiff Vs defendant).
Defendant submits that he can be found to have contributed to the accident since
though ever previously everyone kept their intend to turn, this reliance (in his
judgment) is not absolute in that not everyone at all times are known to keep by
their word. And, although the
defendant in this particular case took extra measures of care and diligence, he
nonetheless could have looked left just once more and possibly have avoided the
None of the above however takes away from the guilt, and/or unlawful action of
the plaintiff to un-mistakenly indicate to the defendant her intend, and as such
her promise to turn before encountering the path of the defendant (right turn).
This guilt of the plaintiff then is not only based upon negligence by
ignorance, as it may be purported, but more so that plaintiff was duly aware of
her signal as also of her relative speed and position upon the road.
And, that for as much as man's eyes are in front of his head - the
defendant of necessity had to turn his head left and right, while the plaintiff
had the defendant in her view at all times, yet made no apparent effort to
fore-come the accident.
The foregoing, in its parts, is based upon plaintiff's own admission (transcript
exhibit 3) that she entered the road (12th Street) from a left.
And upon facts by common knowledge, that; for as much as her vehicle was
in excellent condition - this signal would have turned off automatically
as she recovered from the turn. And
so it is conclusive, as also the consensus of the defendant, that plaintiff
intentionally turned on her right signal truly intending to make said turn.
Plaintiff furthermore upon her own admission confesses to have given
defendant the full indication (signal to the right) that it was not her
intention to pass in front of the defendant (Transcript exhibit 3).
Plaintiff et al., (Passenger) made the following remark at the scene of the
accident, when defendant (somewhat angry) said to the plaintiff; "You were
going to turn right! Why didn’t
you?" To which plaintiff
replied: "No I did not". To
which plaintiff's passenger, before witnesses, replied: "Yes mother you had
your signal on, remember, you were going to turn it off".
hereby introduces transcript of hearing: Leonard Van Zanten, 1-13-94, Division
4, Judge, and Freeman, into evidence, as exhibit 3.
defendant prays for judgment against plaintiffs as follows:
That plaintiff take nothing by way of their complaint.
2. For cost of suit herein.
For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.
June 22 1994. Leonard Van Zanten
LEONARD VAN ZANTEN.
SUPERIOR COURT. MARICOPA COUNTY
/ NO: CV94-05108
MAGARET LOEB, et all
LEONARD VAN ZANTEN /__________________________________
The plaintiff, the court, and all people inquiring after me and into this
before judge Freeman, having pleaded "not guilty," I nonetheless
assumed part of the guilt upon myself, it was for this reason; that if but for
the smallest of guilt is on me and I should come to deny or evade it, it then
will not be men but the Lord my God who will punish me right here and now.
For He will not tolerate that deceit be found in me since I am called by
His name. Nor will He cast me from
Him since being once anointed of Him it is impossible to fall away.
For again, He is a God who will not hold the guilty guiltless, wherefore
should any guile be found in me He will forthwith visit me.
then again of course, aside of this excellent fear of the Lord it was my good
pleasure to before all else judge myself, and render to myself the guilt as also
the innocence that is due. Even as
David said, "A just man chastens himself in his own judgment."
then judge Freeman, having heard the case, asked if I had anything to say, I
thought to recite the law to him by which the case may be judged fairly, which I
did in one of its most eminent expressions so as to leave no doubt nor question.
Moreover, I pronounced the just verdict before him.
But as sound is to one who cannot hear, so he paid no attention to ~ such
wisdom, not even in the least, and came to ferment a false judgment robbing me
of my right under the law.
then made me sad, knowing how in a short while he will surely come to regret
this foolish act, and also somewhat angry, which was more so for the previous
judgments of him to others which I was forced to witness.
The judge did evil in that he justified one of whom he knew she had given
false witness. He praised the liar,
and glorified the thief, justifying her whose deeds were contrary to law.
By what authority then did I pronounce such judgment? And for what reason did I call for an appeal - while all such
things are already slated for their ultimate trial before the High tribunal?
Among other things it was for the benefit of those imprisoned therein,
and showing that the judgments of the courts are for
scrutiny by the Highest Judge. As
then in my reflection upon the courts no confidence was shown that my appeal
might show fruitful before them, I placed my trust before God.
then the plaintiff took it upon herself to attempt to commit armed robbery
against me I turned the affair over to my insurance company, who in turn came
with excuses in the fine print of the contract. I then responded by consulting an attorney to look into that
policy, and meanwhile arrange and/or bargain with the plaintiff for payment of
her damages (to allow her robbery). The
attorney however in his reply came to deny all charges to the plaintiff to which
I signed my name since in fact this was the truth.
therefore I received the second notification I took the matter into my own hand
to show the sentence of the law and how she is to be applied.
This I did not with an aim to be justified by the court, since such
confidence has yet to form itself within me, but as matter of truth and of honor
to testify to the same.
then the plaintiff will find it in herself to apologize for the immoral act
which she committed in placing this action against me (which is as armed
robbery, utilizing the court and/or the law as a weapon by which to commit
robbery), I will find it in me to forgive her.
But if not - she will bear her guilt.
And if the court finds for the law, so much the better for the court, and
if not - they will soon find the roles reversed, and
my judgment on the judges will not be a small matter. For
no man is above the law, nor is there any excuse for anyone sitting in judgment
to be ignorant in the least of what pertains to true law and justice.
wise then will understand how for the sins of the court my blood will flow.
And that for the sins of the people done in ignorance my bones will not
be broken. And that judgment is in the hands of the elect from Him who
judges all things.
22-94. Leonard Van Zanten.
VAN ZANTEN. Riverside CA.
Edmund D Kahn. Tucson AZ.
reply to your "question-remark", this is more than sensible English,
it is REALITY.
of all people ought to know how the whole purpose of the court is to enact
justice, and that the human courts are at all times subject to the Most High
Court. Judge Freeman therefore in
effect, in his verdict to me, signed his own death warrant, while you at present
are not fairing any the better Mr. Kahn to take this matter of life and death so
lightly. You may not believe what I
have said, but your unbelief will not stay that High tribunal, nor for your
resentment will its judgment pass you by.
I should warn you that all this inclusive everything you say and do will before
long become widely known. How then
you will serve yourself to all men is up to you.
Both wisdom and folly is before you, if therefore life means more to you,
and justice is not strange to you, do not allow yourself to be made an accessory
to armed robbery. Was it not the
High Judge of all who said; "It were better for
them to hang a millstone around their neck and be drowned in the sea than to
offend even one of these little ones that serve Me.''
regarding your letter of June 30, I think it rather childish of you to request
from me that which you have already received, namely, my responds to your
Service of Interrogatories, and the documents, a total of 7.
And since you are requesting a Disclosure Statement, the same is herewith
Leonard Van Zanten
Hon. I Sylvan Brown (sa-6)
For Hon. Stanley Z Goodfarb
Edmund D Kahn._____________________
This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs certification Re: Compulsory
Arbitration and Defendants reply thereto. It
appears clear to the court that under the uniform rules of procedure for
arbitration this matter should be sent to arbitration.
Defendant seems to base his objection to arbitration on the fact that there is
no appeal from the award of the arbitrator.
Rule 7 of the uniform rules of procedure for Arbitration clearly provides
the right of appeal.
It is ordered that this matter be sent to
an Arbitrator for arbitration.
Received July 26 -94. Clerk of court.
LAW OFFICES OF.
Edmund d. Kahn. Tucson, Arizona
Arthur W. Vance, Attorney
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA
MARGARET LOEB, et al.,
/ NO. CV 94-05108
JOINT PREHEARING STATEMENT
/ Assigned to Judge
LEONARD ZANTEN, et al.,
TO: THOMAS A. McCarthy JR.,
NOW the parties before this Honorable Court and, pursuant to URPA present the
following Joint Prehearing Statement:
Uncontested Facts Deemed Material:
November 16, 1993 on Colter and 12th Street, Phoenix, Maricopa County, Arizona,
Plaintiffs Margaret, and Samuel Loeb's automobile collided with another
automobile being driven by Defendant Leonard Zanten, while uninsured.
a direct and proximate result of this collision, Plaintiffs Margaret and Samuel
Loeb suffered property damage in the sum of $8,108.61.
Contested Issues of Fact and Law that Counsel can agree are Material or
Defendant Leonard Zanten negligent and, if so, was such negligence a proximate
cause of property damage to Plaintiffs?
Plaintiffs entitled to an award of damages against Defendant and, if so, in what
Plaintiffs entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest on their liquidated
Plaintiffs entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees based upon
Defendant's failure to admit Request for Admissions served on him on May 18,
Other Issues of Fact or Law Which Defendant believes to be Material:
The Following is a List of Witnesses Intended to be Used by Each Party During
Arbitration Hearing: No Witness shall be used at the Hearing other than those
listed, except for good cause shown.
Blanchard #3764, Phoenix Police Department These witnesses will testify along
the lines of the attached Arizona Traffic Accident Report and property damage
estimates and will verify that Plaintiffs suffered property damage in the sum of
The Following is a List of Exhibits, Which Each Party Intends to Use at the
Arbitration Hearing: No Exhibits shall be used other than those listed herein,
except for good cause shown.
Traffic Accident Report
Farm's Drafts Showing Payment of Property Damage
of Property Damage
automobile was repaired in accordance with the enclosed estimates and such
repairs were made in full at a cost of $8,108.61.
of these items have been produced previously on May 18, 1994 in Plaintiffs'
Edmund D. Kahn. Tucson, Arizona. Attorney
Margaret Loeb Vs Van Zanten.
is written; "Their libations of
blood I will not pour out." How
then am I to sign my name to your joint Prehearing statement, for all falsehood
and deceit is as blood guilt.
three separate papers you have already made your introductory clear, and I also
have given my defense in clear statements, why then a repetition?
It may very well be that the court may take our repetition as an insult
to their intelligence.
came to me wishing to play a game for money, a money for which you knew you had
no right, and that we place all our cards open on the table.
Well now Mr. Kahn, in olden days one was likely to get shot on the spot
for such inconsistency of the game. I
however humored you, while you further insisted that nothing may be added.
then Mr. Kahn are you now cheating on your own game, reneging on your own
requests - in adding a charge - as if I failed to admit to your request for
admissions? I indeed failed; I
failed to admit - since I denied your charges.
And now you wish to mock the course of justice and me - merely because I
spoke the truth - pleading not so?
informed you previously that I was an officer of the Most high Court, and as such it
is not only our duty but our pleasure as well to act with truth and justice to
everyone at all times. What is
therefore foremost to my mind is that Mr. Loeb suffer no injustice at my or
anyone's gain or expense, nor that in the course thereof anyone else should
suffer injustice. For again, shall
he not be a fool that ferments injustice to himself? This is how I was taught by the Most High Judge in the
precepts of His justice, not ever to look at anything one-sided, nor to consider
only the one side for which one happens to be the counsel.
have not served your client well in giving her ill advice.
What therefore in the day to come I am to bring upon her I will also
bring upon you. Judge for yourself:
What sort of a judge shall I be, or how shall I ever be a judge in such an
eminent Court if I should pronounce the plaintiff innocent, when in fact she
lied to the defendant as a result of which both parties sustained damages.
now forgave her the lie - taking financial responsibility for the damages to my
vehicle, but how shall I forgive her the theft, or the intended theft, which she
is now perpetrating?
behalf of this defendant inform your client that it is not yet too late, but
that with a letter of apology from her and from you as her counsel, I am ready
to forgive. And should neither of
you be so inclined - no choice will be left me but to reward accordingly.
And that even if the court should find for the defendant - that the same
will not alleviate the plaintiff nor you from guilt.
a counselor you should very well know how the courts in the very law by which
they bind the defendant - have no choice but to find your client equally guilty.
This is inalienable and as without question, the law is very clear on
that matter, if you promise something, you keep it, and if not, you shall be a
thief and liar as well.
now you care to redo your proposed Joint Prehearing Statement, being faithful to
both sides and the facts, without false entries, I will add my name to it.
You have my statements and my list of exhibits, what therefore is to
prevent you from doing it amicable for both?
van Zanten. Defendant.
of foregoing mailed to: D. Kahn. Thomas
A. McCarthy Jr.
Van Zanten. Riverside Ca.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
LOEB, et al.
/ NO. CV
PREHEARING STATEMENT- )
/ Assigned to
VAN ZANTEN /
WILLIAM J. SCHAFER, III
To: HON. WILLIAM J. SCHAFER, III
now the parties before this honorable court, and pursuant to URPA 4, present the
following Prehearing statement.
UNCONTESTED FACTS DEEMED MATERIAL:
November 16 1993 on Colter and 12th street, Phoenix Arizona, Plaintiffs
automobile collided with another vehicle driven by the Defendant, as a result of
which Plaintiff suffered damages in the sum of $ 8,108,61, and defendant in the
sum of $ 2,700.81.
CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACTS AND LAW.
plaintiff was careless, reckless, and negligent in first awarding and promising
the defendant the lawful right to cross the street (12th St.) - then abridging
upon her word, plaintiff proceeded to pass straight on into the path of the
defendant, colliding with the defendant.
in previous trial and hearings, defendants Constitutional rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendment were grossly abused, and is defendant entitled to an
award of damages against the plaintiff for said abuse.
in either case or judgment, by previous agreement neither party shall be
entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest on their liquidated damages,
costs, or attorney fees.